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Some passages in First Amendment law have taken on a life
and legend of their own, entering our cultural lexicon for their
particular power, precision or passion. Some phrases are just so
beautifully written that they cannot escape notice.3 Others aptly
capture the essence of a key concept in a memorable way. Still
others seemingly have grown in importance simply by the
frequency for which they are cited in later court decisions.
In his book, Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best

1. David L. Hudson, Jr. is a First Amendment Fellow with the Freedom
Forum and a Justice Robert H. Jackson Fellow with the Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education. He also is an assistant professor of law at
Belmont University College of Law.
2. Jacob David Glenn is Professor Hudson’s research assistant and a
third-year law student at Belmont University College of Law. He holds a
Master of Divinity degree in addition to his legal studies.
3. David L. Hudson, Jr., 5 Favorite First Amendment Passages, FREEDOM
F. INST. (Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2011/03/08/5favorite-first-amendment-passages.
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Judges, Ross Guberman writes of “some of the most enduring
passages in opinion-writing history.”4 Some of the most legendary
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes5
and Robert Jackson,6 were wordsmiths who crafted time-honored
passages. The following ten phrases from U.S. Supreme Court
First Amendment decisions qualify as some of the most enduring
passages in First Amendment jurisprudence.
“FIXED STAR”
Depending on if, when, and where you attended public
school, you may have begun your days reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance. Perhaps this filled you with a sense of pride. Perhaps
not. Perhaps you thought, “This seems a bit totalitarian.”
Perhaps, like a proud patriot, you looked upon those cynical free
thinkers with disgust. Whatever your reaction, it is worth
remembering that the reactions of Americans in the World War
II era led to two U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The
Supreme
Court’s decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette7 was the culmination of a battle between government
and school officials who sought to enforce conformity and
patriotism on the one hand and Jehovah Witnesses and their
religious beliefs on the other. The West Virginia legislature
required its schools to conduct courses in history, civics, and
constitutional studies.8 West Virginia took this step with the
express purpose of “teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the

4. ROSS GUBERMAN. POINT TAKEN: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE WORLD’S BEST
JUDGES xxiii (2015).
5. Nina Varsava, Elements of Judicial Style: A Quantitative Guide to Neil
Gorsuch’s Opinion Writing, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 82 (2018) (listing
Holmes as one of three justices with a “diverse vocabular[y]” and a justice
“recognized for [his] narrative skill.”).
6. Gregory Chernak, The Clash of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson,
Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 51, 57 n.26 (1999)
(“Jackson was also one of the greatest writers to serve on the nation’s highest
court.”); Charles Patrick Thomas, A New Deal Approach to Statutory
Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored by Justice Robert Jackson, 44 J. LEGIS.
132, 133 (2017)) (noting that “Jackson is probably best remembered as an
impressive advocate and wordsmith.”).
7. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
8. Id. at 624.
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ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism, and increasing the
knowledge of the organization and machinery of the
government.”9 With the disastrous rise of socialism and fascism
in Europe, it is easy to understand why American legislators felt
compelled to inculcate strong national values in the American
youth. But instead of filling them with American pride, some
critics felt the expressly nationalist push in curriculum and—in
particular—the recitation of the pledge of allegiance was
inappropriately similar to tactics adopted by German leader
Adolph Hitler (such as the Hitler Youth programs).10
Among the chorus of disapproving voices, some of the most
resolute protesters were Jehovah’s Witnesses.11 The Jehovah’s
Witnesses based their opposition in biblical verses like Exodus
20:4–5: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt
not bow down thyself to them nor serve them.”12 The Jehovah’s
Witnesses felt the flag of the United States of America was one
such “image,” and they believed it was a sin for their children to
begin the school day saluting and pledging it their allegiance.13
In the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ minds, this was tantamount to
bowing themselves down.
Barnette appeared before the Court just three years after the
Court’s decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.14 In that
decision, the Court upheld a Minersville, Pennsylvania public
school practice of compelling students to salute the flag and
pledge it their allegiance; in spite of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
protestations—and ruling during the uncertain World War II
era—the Court reasoned the Minersville policy was a secular
policy that furthered the legitimate goal of cultivating national
unity.15 Justice Felix Frankfurter explained, “[w]hat the school
authorities are really asserting is the right to awaken in the
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Id. at 599–600.

191

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 15

child’s mind considerations as to the significance of the flag
contrary to those implanted by the parent.”16 Only Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone dissented. After Gobitis, it was
understandable that the West Virginia Board of Education in
Barnette felt confident passing its own flag salute and pledge of
allegiance policies in 1942.
Nonetheless, the Jehovah’s Witnesses proved themselves
stalwart in their continued fight against compelled speech. When
the Jehovah’s Witness students refused to salute and pledge
allegiance to the flag, West Virginia responded with measures as
drastic as expulsion, relocation to reformatory schools (typically
reserved for students with criminal inclinations), and prosecution
of parents for causing their children to become delinquents.17 The
Jehovah’s Witnesses brought suit, and, believing the Gobitis
decision clearly supported its actions, the West Virginia Board of
Education moved for dismissal.18 When the District Court
refused dismissal, the Board of Education appealed directly to
the United States Supreme Court.19
Justice Jackson authored the Court’s eloquent opinion. First,
he observed that the Jehovah’s Witnesses did not claim rights
which would interfere with the rights of others, that the case
involved neither violent nor disruptive behavior but peaceable
refusal to engage in compulsory behavior, and that “the sole
conflict [was] between authority and rights of the individual”
before the State.20 Here, the Court faced the issue of the
“compulsion of students to declare a belief.”21 Acknowledging the
dynamic at play, Jackson then expounded upon the significance
of the compulsion in question—he found it far from benign:
There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag
salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but
effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or
flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality,

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631.
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is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political
parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty
of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. The
State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns
and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks
through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and
clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas
just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones.
Associated with many of these symbols are appropriate
gestures of acceptance or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared
head, a bended knee.22

Ultimately, the Court decided that the West Virginia Board
of Education could not constitutionally compel students to
participate in saluting and pledging the flag allegiance.23 Jackson
looked to the enduring Bill of Rights axiom that “[o]ne’s right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”24
Tracing and revivifying the First Amendment’s line in the sand,
Justice Jackson closed his opinion (in part) with the epic passage:
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”25
The Supreme Court has cited Jackson’s “fixed star” language
in numerous decisions, including those involving compelled
speech,26 political party free associational rights,27 flag-burning,28
school prayer,29 library book censorship,30 political patronage,31
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

(2013).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 642.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. 205, 220
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 616 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985).
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982).
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514 n.9 (1980).
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Communist Party cases,32 and bar applicant cases.33 All told,
more than 250 judicial decisions have cited Justice Jackson’s
famous “fixed star” passage.
“SHOUTING FIRE”
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is widely considered,
along with Justice Louis Brandeis, to be one of the fathers of the
First Amendment.34 He authored many of the seminal decisions
that explained why our country should protect freedom of speech.
For example, he first used the terminology “clear and present
danger” more than a hundred years ago to help draw the line
between protected and unprotected speech in Schenck v. United
States.35
But, Holmes produced another phrase in his Schenck opinion
that may be even better known, a phrase deeply enmeshed in our
culture—”shouting fire in a theatre.” One scholar refers to it as
“the most enduring analogy in constitutional law” that “has
permeated popular discourse on the scope of individual rights.”36
The case involved the prosecution of Charles T. Schenck and
Elizabeth Baer for distributing leaflets urging people to refuse to
comply with the draft. Schenck, the general secretary of the
Socialist Party, opposed U.S. involvement in World War I and
believed that conscription was akin to slavery.37 In the leaflets,
Schenck and Baer mentioned the Thirteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, which outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude.
In other words, the political dissidents believed that conscription
into the armed forces amounted to a form of indentured
servitude. The leaflets urged no violence and included the phrase

32. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 268 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
33. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs. of N. M., 353 U.S. 232, 244 n.15 (1957).
34. David Cole, Agon at Agura: Creative Misreadings in the First
Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1986) (referring to Holmes and
Brandies “two strong fathers of the First Amendment”).
35. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 247, 52 (1919).
36. Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in a Theater:” The Life and Times
of Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
181, 181 (2015).
37. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
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“Assert Your Rights.”38 Nevertheless, Justice Holmes affirmed
the convictions for a unanimous Supreme Court. He explained:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would
have been within their constitutional rights. But the character
of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic. . . . The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is question of proximity and degree.39

In this passage, Holmes explained that in times of war the
government can place greater restrictions on freedom of speech.
He also gave what scholar Stephen Feldman has identified as “a
prototypical example of unprotected expression.”40 Frederick
Schauer has called it “a ubiquitous weapon in the speech
restrictor’s rhetorical arsenal.”41
Holmes’ classic “fire in a theatre” is perhaps the most-often
quoted phrase from First Amendment jurisprudence. It has
transcended the Supreme Court Reports into the normal cultural
sphere. For example, years ago when asked by a reporter why
used uttered mean things about an opponent, former world
heavyweight boxing champion “Iron” Mike Tyson responded: “It’s
not like I yelled fire in a theater or something.”42
Ironically, some of Holmes’ contemporaries and friends were
not pleased either with Holmes’ opinion in Schenck or his
“shouting fire in a theatre” language. For example, political
38. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51.
39. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
40. Stephen M. Feldmen, Free Speech, World War I, and Republican

Democracy: The Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192, 208
(2011).
41. Frederick Schauer, Every Possible Use of Language, in THE FREE
SPEECH CENTURY 33 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019)
42. David L. Hudson, Jr., What a Phrase: “Falsely Shouting ‘Fire’ in a
Theatre,”
FREEDOM
F.
INST.
(Dec.
11.
2019),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/12/11/what-a-phrase-falselyshouting-fire-in-a-theatre.
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scientist Ernst Freund objected to the analogy of “shouting fire in
a theatre” to speech by political dissidents.43
Interestingly, many misquote Holmes’ passage by adding in
the adjective “crowded” to make it “shouting fire in a crowded
theatre.”44 For example, Justice William O. Douglas added the
adjective “crowded” before theatre when speaking of Holmes’
favorite metaphor.45 Holmes never used the adjective “crowded.”
Perhaps even more ominously, some omit the adverb “falsely”
from Holmes’ famous phrase. Obviously, the First Amendment
would protect a speaker who truthfully warns of a fire.
The U.S. Supreme Court later cited Holmes’ shouting fire
phrase in decisions involving alleged true threats,46 broadcast
indecency,47 civil rights marching,48 prior restraints on public
speakers,49 and noise control ordinances.50 More than 130 judicial
opinions in all have cited Justice Holmes’ famous “shouting fire”
passage.
“MORE SPEECH, NOT ENFORCED SILENCE”
One of the most important doctrines in First Amendment
jurisprudence is the counter-speech doctrine—the idea that when
confronted with harmful or wrongheaded speech, the best
alternative is not censorship but counter speech.51 The doctrine is
traced back to Justice Louis Brandeis’ concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California,52 involving the prosecution of Charlotte
43. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine, 50 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1205, 1282 (1983) (writing that Freund was
“horrified” that Holmes would compare shouting fire in a theater to speech by
political dissidents); Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 LAW &
HIST. REV. 661, 682 (2012).
44. Larson, supra note 36, at 182.
45. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 444, 456 (Douglas, J., concurring).
46. N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S 886, 927 n.70 (1982).
47. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978).
48. Cox v. La., 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965).
49. Kunz v. N. Y., 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
50. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949).
51. David L. Hudson, Jr., More Speech, Not Enforced Silence, FREEDOM F.
INST. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2020/02/07/morespeech-not-enforced-silence [hereinafter Hudson, More Speech].
52. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–81 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
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Anita Whitney under a California criminal syndicalism law. Her
crime was assisting in facilitating a meeting of the Communist
Labor Party in Oakland, California.53
Whitney was the daughter of a former California state
senator and the niece of former U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Field.54
A peaceful political activist, Whitney
nevertheless was arrested and charged for violating the state’s
criminal syndicalism law. She took her case all the way to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed her conviction.
However, Justice Louis Brandeis—joined by Justice
Holmes—penned a memorable concurring opinion that scholar
Vincent Blasi has called “the most important essay ever written,
on or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.”55
The concurring opinion reads like a dissenting opinion, causing
scholars Ronald K.L. Collins and David Skover to call it a
“curious concurrence.”56 They explain that Brandeis’ opinion in
Whitney was a draft that he had originally written as a
dissenting opinion in the case of Charles Ruthenburg, who died
before the Supreme Court could issue an opinion.57
Brandeis famously authored the following passage that
stands for the counter-speech principle: “If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.”58
Time and again over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court and
many lower courts have invoked the counter-speech doctrine as
the preferred First Amendment remedy. For example, in United
States v. Alvarez,59 a case involving the federal prosecution of a

concurring).
53. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372.
54. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:
The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653,
656 (1988).
55. Id. at 668.
56. Ronald K.L. Collins & David Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice
Brandeis’ Opinion in Whitney v. California, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 333, 335 (2005).
57. Id. at 371.
58. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
59. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
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man who lied about receiving military medals, Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote that “[t]he remedy for speech that is false is
speech that is true.”60
Many judges through the years have invoked the counterspeech doctrine in First Amendment opinions. For example,
Justice Thurgood Marshall—as ardent a defender of free speech
who has ever sat on the High Court61—years earlier invoked the
counter-speech doctrine in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, invalidating a New Jersey municipal ordinance
banning “for sale” signs in the midst of what city officials
perceived to be white flight.62 Justice Marshall quoted Justice
Brandeis’s famous passage in Whitney and added that the city
could not ban the signs but could engage in the “processes of
education” to promote integrated housing.63
At times, it is most tempting to censor speech or to call for
the censorship of speech we don’t like. But before engaging in
those impulses, we should consider Justice Brandeis’s timehonored message of “more speech, not enforced silence.”64
“A PROFOUND NATIONAL COMMITMENT”
The essence of the First Amendment is the ability of citizens
to criticize the government. Justice William Brennan captured
this concept memorably in the landmark libel decision New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,65 when he wrote:
Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open and
that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public

60. Id. at 727.
61. David L. Hudson, Jr. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Great Defender of

First Amendment Free-Speech Rights for the Powerless, 2 HOW. HUM. & C. R. L.
REV. 167 (2018).
62. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
63. Id. at 97.
64. Hudson, More Speech, supra note 51.
65. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (emphasis added).
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officials.66

The case involved The New York Times publishing an
editorial advertisement in March 1960 titled, “Heed Their Rising
Voices.”67 The ad criticized “Southern violators” of the civil rights
of African American students and accused these violators of a
“wave of terror” against these civil rights protestors.68 Some of
the ad focused on the mistreatment of students and civil rights
leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., in Montgomery, Ala.69
The commissioner in charge of the police department, L.B.
Sullivan, sued The New York Times in an Alabama state court for
defamation even though he was not named in the advertisement.
An all-white Alabama jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 in
damages—a verdict upheld by the Alabama state appellate
courts.70
However, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed and
issued a landmark First Amendment decision. The court noted
that “libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations”71 and instead such laws “must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”72 The Court also
noted that “erroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable in free
debate”73 and it would chill free speech to impose crushing
liability for newspapers who made mistakes.74
The Court proceeded to find that public officials who sue for
libel, like L.B. Sullivan, must meet a high standard of proof.
They must show that the publisher printed the statements
knowing they were false or acted with “reckless disregard.” Such
was born the “actual malice” standard.75
The essence of the ruling in Times v. Sullivan is that citizens
have a First Amendment right to criticize government officials.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 270.
Editorial, Heeding Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–57.
Id. 257–58.
Id. 256.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 279–80.
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This hallmark principle resonates throughout Justice Brennan’s
opinion but perhaps most forcefully in his beautiful language
that talks about a “profound national commitment,” “uninhibited,
robust and wide open” debate” and “vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.”76
The Supreme Court has cited Justice Brennan’s famous
phrase many times in the subsequent years. In 2011, for
example, Chief Justice John Roberts quoted the phrase in
multiple First Amendment cases—two involving restrictions on
campaign expenditures or contributions77 and another on a
restriction on funeral protests.78 Various justices would quote the
passage in subsequent defamation opinions.79 Still other
decisions involving the free-speech rights of public employees
refer to the “profound national commitment” to “robust” debate.80
Court decisions on picketing also quoted Brennan’s famous
words.81 All in all, more than 840 First Amendment decisions
have cited Justice Brennan’s memorable language.
“BEDROCK PRINCIPLE”
Many people support free speech as an ideal but when
confronted with the reality of ugly speech their commitment to
free expression dissipates. The late great Nat Hentoff captured
this censorial impulse in his book Free Speech for Me—But Not
for Thee.82
76. David L. Hudson, Jr., ‘A Profound National Commitment’ to ‘Robust’
Debate,
FREEDOM
F.
INST.
(Dec.
16,
2019),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/12/16/a-profound-nationalcommitment-to-robust-debate.
77. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S.
721, 755 (2011); FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007).
78. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011).
79. See, e.g., Harte Hank Comm’s v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686
(1989); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986).
80. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 162 (1983) (J. Brennan, dissenting);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976).
81. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); Chicago Police Dept. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
82. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME—BUT NOT FOR THEE: HOW THE
AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER (1992).
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But the reality is that the First Amendment protects much
speech that is obnoxious, offensive and repugnant. Justice
William Brennan expressed this principle eloquently in his
majority opinion in the flag-burning decision Texas v. Johnson.83
Brennan wrote:
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable. 84

Gregory Johnson participated in a “Republican War Chest
Tour” protest in Dallas, Texas—the site of the 1984 Republican
National Convention.85 While Johnson doused the flag with
kerosene, others chanted, “America, red, white and blue, we spit
on you.”86 No one was physically harmed by the protest activities,
but several witnesses were offended greatly by the burning of the
flag.87 Authorities arrested only Johnson of all the protestors.88
They charged him under a Texas law criminalizing the
desecration of the American flag, a “venerated object.”89
The Supreme Court narrowly ruled 5-4 in favor of Johnson.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan reasoned that the law
was unconstitutional because it suppressed Johnson’s speech
because of the offensiveness of his message.90 Justice Brennan
explained that “[t]he way to preserve the flag’s special role is not
to punish those who feel differently about these matters” and “to
persuade them that they are wrong.”91
The Supreme Court has quoted or paraphrased Justice
Brennan’s “bedrock principle” quote many times in subsequent
First Amendment decisions, including ones involving disparaging
trademarks,92
funeral
protests,93
cross-burning,94
art
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. at 407–08.
Id. at 419.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
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censorship,95 and anonymous campaign speech.96 Nearly 200
other court decisions have quoted or paraphrased Justice
Brennan’s “bedrock principle” language.
A lasting legacy of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Texas v.
Johnson is his “bedrock principle” phrase, which has become a
cardinal First Amendment concept—that the First Amendment
protects much offensive, obnoxious and even repugnant speech.97
“ONE MAN’S VULGARITY IS ANOTHER’S LYRIC”
“One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” is one of the more
notable First Amendment phrases in history. Its author was
Justice John Marshall Harlan II, a man who was not a leftleaning liberal or supporter of offensive behavior. In fact, Harlan
II—the grandson of his namesake known as “the Great
Dissenter”—was often regarded as one of the most conservative
members of the Warren Court.98 He was known primarily as a
proponent of the doctrine of judicial restraint. However, during
his last year on the bench, he issued a majority opinion in Cohen
v. California,99 a rather remarkable First Amendment opinion
involving vulgar expression on a jacket.
The case began in April 1968, when Paul Robert Cohen wore
a jacket to a Los Angeles County Courthouse bearing the words
“Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courtroom.100 A police officer
passed a note to the judge, asking that Cohen be held in

93. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458.
94. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.

377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 601 (1998)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
96. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 378 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
97. David L. Hudson, Jr., The ‘Bedrock Principle’ of the First Amendment,
FREEDOM
F.
INST.
(Dec.
20,
2019),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/12/20/the-bedrock-principle-of-thefirst-amendment.
98. Clay Calvert, Revisiting the Right to Offend Forty Years After Cohen v.
California: One Case’s Legacy on First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2011).
99. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 315 (1971).
100. Id. at 316.
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contempt for the message on his jacket.101 However, the judge
refused to find Cohen in contempt.102
The police officer then waited until Cohen left the courtroom
and then arrested him in the lobby for breach of the peace.103 The
state law prohibited “maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the
peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive
conduct. . . .”104A Los Angeles Municipal Court judge found Cohen
guilty and sentenced him to 30 days imprisonment.105 Cohen
appealed his conviction, because—as he told one of the authors of
this article—”I did not want to serve 30 days in jail.”106
The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, finding that it
was foreseeable that the offensive conduct of wearing a jacket
with that message could lead someone to react with violence.107
His attorneys appealed to the California Supreme Court, which
declined to hear the case.108
The last chance for young Mr. Cohen stood before the U.S.
Supreme Court, which now only takes less than 80 cases a year
out of thousands of petitions. Surprisingly, the Court took the
case and ruled in favor of Mr. Cohen by a slim 5-4 margin.
Justice Harlan began his opinion by noting that “[t]his case may
seem at first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our
books, but the issue it presents is of no small constitutional
significance.”109
The conservative Justice noted that the conviction rested
upon the content of the words.110 The state argued that the words
“Fuck the Draft” was a form of obscenity, an unprotected

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 319 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316.
David L. Hudson, Jr., Paul Robert Cohen and His Famous Free Speech
Case,
FREEDOM
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INST.
(May
4,
2016),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2016/05/04/paul-robert-cohen-and-hisfamous-free-speech-case [hereinafter Hudson, Cohen Free Speech Case].
107. Id. at 317.
108. Id. at 317.
109. Id. at 316.
110. Id. at 418.
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category of expression in First Amendment law.111 Harlan
rejected the notion that the jacket was legally obscene, writing
that “such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.”112
The state also argued that Cohen’s profane message
amounted to fighting words, defined by the U.S. Supreme Court
as “words which by their very utterance inflict injury or cause an
immediate breach of the peace.”113 The Court had created the
fighting words exception in Chaplinsky, a case involving a
Jehovah Witness who had cursed at a local marshal.114
But, Justice Harlan rejected the fighting-words argument,
saying that the words were not directed at a specific individual.
He explained:
First, the principle contended for by the State seems inherently
boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other
offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the
most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable
general principle exists for stopping short of that result were
we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular
four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more
distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless
often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed,
we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual. 115

This important passage—particularly the words “one man’s
vulgarity is another’s lyric” —indicates that Justice Harlan
recognized the eye-of-the-beholder aspect of offensiveness. What
is offensive to one may not be offensive to another. What one
person may consider highly offensive, another may consider a
high form of art. Often, distasteful expression is in the eye of the
beholder. As prolific First Amendment scholar Clay Calvert
explains, the phrase is consonant with the modern void-for-

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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vagueness doctrine.116
Harlan’s phrase has found its way into other volumes of the
United States Reports, most often in dissenting opinions. Justice
Harry Blackmun, who dissented in Cohen, cited it with no great
pleasure in his dissenting opinion in the fighting words decision
Lewis v. New Orleans.117 Justice John Paul Stevens quoted the
phrase in his partial dissenting opinion in the obscenity case
Pope v. Illinois.118 Justice Sonia Sotomayor quoted Harlan’s
famous phrase in her separate concurring in part and dissenting
in part opinion in the vulgar trademark decision Iancu v.
Brunetti.119
Many lower courts cited the phrase in finding that profanity
by itself does not equate to fighting words.120 Suffice it to say, the
Cohen case has been cited countless times in judicial opinions,
many times specifically for Harlan’s wondrous little phrase.
“One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” captures the essence
of freedom and the First Amendment. In the words of Cohen
himself, “the government shouldn’t be able to decide what speech
an individual can or cannot speak[.]”121
“WE ARE A RELIGIOUS PEOPLE WHOSE INSTITUTIONS
PRESUPPOSE A SUPREME BEING”
Justice William O. Douglas wrote this famous phrase in
Zorach v. Clauson,122 a case involving a New York student
release program that allowed students to leave class—and
116. Calvert, supra note 98, at 12.
117. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 140 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).
118. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 514–15 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part).
119. 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2315 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
120. See, e.g., Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 212 (3d. Cir. 2003) (citing
Harlan’s passage in noting that police officer did not have probable cause to
arrest a defendant for disorderly conduct merely because he uttered profanity);
State v. McKenna, 415 A. 2d 729, 731 (R.I. 1980) (ruling that a juvenile’s
profanities directed at police officers standing more than 10 feet away were not
fighting words)
121. Hudson, Cohen Free Speech Case, supra note 106.
122. 343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952).

205

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 15

campus—to attend religious education. In Zorach, unlike
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,123 no public-school classrooms were
utilized and all costs relating to these programs were borne by
the religious organizations involved.124 New York taxpayers who
disapproved of the program raised Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause challenges against the program.125
Declining to engage in judicial legislation by ruling on the
wisdom of the program, the majority explained the real issue was
“whether New York . . . either prohibited the ‘free exercise’ of
religion or . . . made a law ‘respecting an establishment of
religion’ within the meaning of the First Amendment.”126 In so
doing, the Court weighed the upholding of the Establishment
Clause against the integral importance religion played in both
the founding and the continuing existence of the United States.127
While “[t]here is much talk of separation of Church and State in
the history of the Bill of Rights and in the decisions clustering
around the First Amendment,”128 it is simultaneously true that
the First Amendment “does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State.”129 Justice
Douglas artfully wrote:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and
creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We
sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no
partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its

123. 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
124. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308–09.
125. Id. at 309–10 (“[T]he weight and influence of the school is put behind a

program for religious instruction; public school teachers police it, keeping tab on
students who are released; the classroom activities come to a halt while the
students who are released for religious instruction are on leave; the school is a
crutch on which the churches are leaning for support in their religious training;
without the cooperation of the schools this “released time” program, like the one
in the McCollum case, would be futile and ineffective.”).
126. Id. at 310.
127. Id. at 312–13.
128. Id. at 312.
129. Id.
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dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs.130

Douglas’s language has been cited in numerous landmark
freedom of religion cases. In Marsh v. Chambers, Chief Justice
Warren Burger cited Douglas’ language in ruling constitutional
Nebraska’s practice of opening its legislative days with prayer by
a state-paid chaplain.131 Burger found particularly significant the
“unbroken practice for two centuries in the National Congress
and for more than a century in Nebraska and in many other
states.”132 The next year, in Lynch v. Donnelly, Burger cited the
phrase again in his opinion upholding the constitutionality of a
Nativity crèche in a municipality’s annual Christmas display.133
More recently, the Court cited Douglas’ famous phrase in
Van Orden v. Perry, a decision involving an Establishment
Clause challenge to a Ten Commandments monument in a Texas
public park.134 Thomas Van Orden, an offended observer raised
an Establishment Clause challenge to the monument which had
been in place for decades.135 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
observed: “Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet
these institutions must not press religious observances upon
their citizens.”136 In Van Orden, that the monument was a part of
a long tradition of observing the presupposition of a Supreme
Being—coupled with its definitively passive, non-oppressive
nature—was enough to defeat the Establishment Clause
challenge.137
Justice Douglas’ words have found their way into numerous
lower court opinions as well. Among the words’ most bold
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 313–14 (emphasis added).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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invocations is their inclusion in a 2019 Third Circuit opinion
upholding a Pennsylvania House of Representatives policy
limiting its pre-legislative session prayers to theists only.138
Judge Thomas L. Ambro further underscored the significance of
the presumption of a Supreme Being by pointing to the thenrecent words of Justice Samuel Alito: “prayer is by definition
religious.”139 The presupposition of a Supreme Being is a
component of American cultural, governmental, and judicial
history that has found and will likely continue to find its way
into state and federal opinions at all levels.
“OUR WHOLE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE REBELS AT
THE THOUGHT OF GIVING GOVERNMENT THE POWER TO
CONTROL MEN’S MINDS”
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote this famous sentence in
Stanley v. Georgia, a case involving the execution of a search
warrant by federal and state officers upon the residence of a
Georgia man suspected of illegal bookmaking.140 While “very
little evidence of bookmaking activity” was found, the officers
discovered several reels of eight-millimeter film containing
obscene material.141 The officers arrested the man, and he was
subsequently convicted of violating a Georgia law prohibiting the
possession of “obscene matter.”142
Of the defendant’s several challenges to his conviction, the
Supreme Court only found it necessary to discuss one: “[I]nsofar
as [Georgia] punishes mere private possession of obscene matter,
[the State] violates the First Amendment.”143 Writing on behalf of
the Court, Justice Marshall wrote:
[The convicted Georgia man] is asserting the right to read or
observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual
and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He is

138. Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 963 F.3d 142, 152 (2019).
139. Id. (citing Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087
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asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the
contents of his library. . . .Whatever may be the justifications
for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they
reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds.144

Stanley set the precedent that “the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene
material a crime.”145 Justice John Paul Stevens loved Marshall’s
words, citing it in not only a later obscenity decision146—but also
in cases involving abortion147 and the drugging of inmates.148
More than 50 subsequent decisions have cited the passage.
“THE HUMAN SPIRIT”
Justice Marshall—ever the eloquent First Amendment
defender149—waxed eloquently about the importance of freedom
of expression a few years after Stanley v. Georgia in a case
involving prison inmates. Procunier v Martinez involved
California Department of Corrections’ rules limiting inmate
correspondence.150 Under the restrictive rules, inmates could not
write letters in which they “unduly complained,” “magnified
grievances,” or “express[ed] inflammatory political, racial,
religious or other views or beliefs.”151
The Court ruled against the rules, writing that prison
144.
145.
146.
147.
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officials “failed to show that these broad restrictions on prisoner
mail were in any way necessary to the furtherance of a
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression.”152
Justice Marshall concurred but went further in his separate
opinion, reasoning that prison officials should not be able to read
inmate mail.153 He then explained in beautiful language why the
First Amendment was important to prisoners who are shut off
from the rest of the world:
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity,
but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands selfexpression. Such expression is an integral part of the
development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress
expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition
and affront the individual’s worth and dignity. 154

He further explained that prisoners need a “medium for selfexpression” and that the First Amendment satisfies the
yearnings of the human spirit.155
The Court’s opinion in Procunier v. Martinez represented the
Court’s “high water mark” for protecting prisoner rights.156
Unfortunately, the waters have receded since then, as the Court
has gradually lowered the standard of review for prisoner
regulations and sanctioned more and more forms of censorship.157
“UNDIFFERENTIATED FEAR”
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court famously ruled that public
school students possess First Amendment free-speech rights and
that they don’t “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
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speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”158 School officials
in Des Moines, Iowa, banned students from wearing black peace
armbands for fear that the armbands might arouse feelings and
lead to possible problems at school. But, Justice Abe Fortas,
memorably wrote: “[b]ut, in our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression.”159 He explained that school officials
needed to show that the student expression would cause a
substantial disruption of school activities in order to censor the
student expression.160
Justice Fortas’ language of “undifferentiated fear” not
outweighing the freedom of expression appropriately recognizes
the value of freedom of expression and that school officials must
be able to point to actual evidence of disruption or at the very
least a reasonable forecast of disruption rather than a
generalized fear or speculation.
The Court has used the phrase in a variety of First
Amendment cases other than school cases, including profanity
and fighting words161 and picketing.162 Justice Brennan quoted
the phrase in dissenting opinions involving obscenity163 and
public employee speech.164 Approximately, 350 First Amendment
decisions have quoted Justice Fortas’ famous warning about
“undifferentiated fear” from Tinker.
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